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PARADIGM SHIFT: FEDERAL SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
Steven M. Davidoff* 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2007, Oaktree Capital Management LLC, a U.S.-based hedge 
fund adviser with over $40 billion in assets under management, sold 
approximately 14% of its equity for more than $800 million in a widespread 
underwritten offering to a number of prospective purchasers.1 If the offering 
had been a public one it would have been the year’s sixth-largest initial 
public offering by a domestic issuer.2 But Oaktree deliberately chose not to 
raise this capital on the public market, thereby forgoing a listing on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq. Instead, Oaktree made its initial 
offering on the U.S. private market. The company thereafter listed its equity 
securities on Goldman Sachs & Co.’s non-public market, the “GS Tradable 
Unregistered Equity OTC Market” (GSTrUE).3 On the heels of this 
offering, Apollo Management L.P., a private equity fund adviser, conducted 
a similarly structured equity offering, privately raising $828 million and 
immediately thereafter listing the equity securities on GSTrUE.4 
These two offerings were historically extraordinary. They were the first 
two substantial underwritten offerings and listings of domestic equity 
securities on a U.S. private rather than public market.5 The two offerings 
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 1. See Tom Petruno, Oaktree in Private Share Offering, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at C1. 
 2. Bloomberg Terminal Database (search data on file with author). The figure excludes initial 
public offerings by special purpose acquisition companies. 
 3. See Petruno, supra note 1. 
 4. See Apollo Raises $828 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at C6. Neither Oaktree nor 
Apollo explained the reason for a private equity offering and listing rather than a public one. 
Commentators speculated that the decision was made to avoid application of U.S. securities laws 
which the offerors perceived as unduly burdensome and restrictive. See Petruno, supra note 1; 
Henny Sender, Live at Apollo Management: Plan to Cash in, Limit Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 17, 
2007, at C1. On April 8, 2008, Apollo Global Management filed a registration statement on Form 
S-1 to register with the SEC the shares issued in its offering on GSTRuE. In its filing Apollo 
announced that it would transfer the listing of its equity securities from GSTRuE to the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). See Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 
cover, (Apr. 8, 2008). It appears that the registration of these securities and move to the NYSE 
was contemplated at the time of Apollo’s initial offering on GSTRuE. Apollo’s GSTRuE offering 
may therefore have been a transitory way for Apollo to immediately sell equity interests rather 
than incurring the delay of a more time-consuming registration process.  
 5. See Sender, supra note 4. 
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are also emblematic of a paradigm shift occurring in the capital markets: 
The market for capital is increasingly competitive and global, viable public 
and private markets are proliferating world wide, domestic investing 
patterns are changing as intermediary investing and deretailization occur, 
and financial innovation is quickening. The result is an on-going, perhaps 
revolutionary, transformation in the scope and structure of the global and 
domestic capital markets. The shift is already providing issuers with non-
traditional options for capital-raising and risk management, the former 
illustrated by the Oaktree and Apollo offerings.6 And it may alter core 
assumptions about the optimal capital structure for corporate entities as 
issuers spurn public equity markets for alternative markets and financial 
products to replace their traditional capital sources.7 
This paradigm shift is also calling into question the necessary 
parameters and content of securities regulation. In a more competitive and 
transformed capital market, historical federal securities regulation is 
increasingly inapposite and in need of reform. However, regulatory action is 
also more difficult as markets provide ever more viable choices and the 
ability to structure capital needs to circumvent such regulation.8 This “sub-
revolution” in regulatory calculus is one that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has yet to significantly account for in its rule-making 
process. Instead, the SEC continues to regulate largely without heed to this 
transformed landscape.9 
This essay concerns this paradigmatic shift in the capital markets and its 
implications for the SEC regulatory process and the future of federal 
securities regulation. Part I sets forth three significant developments in the 
new capital market: the global proliferation of viable private and public 
markets, the trend of investment intermediation and deretailization, and the 
accelerated pace of financial innovation. Part II highlights the failure of the 
SEC to account for these events. The SEC’s current regulatory process, to 
the extent it historically produced functional regulation, no longer achieves 
this end in a variety of contexts. The recent SEC rule-making experience 
with respect to hedge funds highlights both the flaws in current SEC rule-
making and the Agency drivers producing this regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.C, which details these developments in the context of the recent 
wave of private equity acquisitions and the private market it fosters. 
 8. Illustratively, if the SEC promulgates regulation which is, in aggregate effect, socially 
beneficial but imposes a particular economic burden on issuers raising public capital, these issuers 
can increasingly respond by forgoing this option instead of resorting to less regulated private or 
non-U.S. markets offering competitive alternatives. 
 9. To be fair, despite its inaction, the SEC has publicly recognized some of these forces. In a 
recent speech at University of Pennsylvania Law School, Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel of 
the SEC, spoke extensively on the deretailization trend in the U.S. securities markets. See Brian G. 
Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Speech at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute 
for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm [hereinafter Cartwright Speech]. 
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The essay concludes by briefly assessing the prospects for federal 
securities reform and suggests a new SEC regulatory-process model 
grounded in regulatory cost-benefit analysis. A new global capital market 
landscape is inexorably being created, a reality that the SEC will inevitably 
have to acknowledge as the flaws in its current regulation and regulatory 
approach are increasingly teased forth. It is a transformation that has a real 
chance to engender substantive change in the scope, structure and content of 
the federal securities laws. The SEC will inevitably be forced to act. If the 
SEC promulgates regulation that not only pays heed to the new capital 
markets paradigm, but does so in a manner comporting with sound 
regulatory process, it will do so in a more economical and responsive 
manner. 
I. THE NEW PARADIGM 
A. MARKET PROLIFERATION 
Securities markets are proliferating globally, growing in prominence 
and meaningfully competing with the regulated U.S. public securities 
market. The primary regulatory consequences are manifold. First, as 
securities offering activity increasingly occurs on these alternative markets, 
the U.S. public securities market—the regulatory focus of the SEC—is 
rapidly losing its dominant position as the principal place to raise equity 
capital.10 Second, market proliferation exposes a dilemma for the SEC. The 
simple prohibition or regulation of a security is no longer a complete 
regulatory solution. In such a circumstance, prohibitory or restrictive 
regulation of this nature will simply cause trading or investing in the 
relevant security to migrate to foreign or private markets. Third, this shift 
raises issues and prospects of enhanced SEC regulation of private markets 
to the extent that it implicates the SEC’s regulatory mission—the protection 
of investors and the integrity of markets generally.11 
1. The Private Domestic Offering and Trading Market 
The private securities offering market in the United States is structured 
to comply with the federal securities law exemptions for registration of 
securities. Generally, as long as an issuer solicits and raises capital from 
investors with a certain aggregate minimum net worth, the offering need not 
be registered and only limited provisions of the securities laws apply, 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See generally COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 29–39 (2006), 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html [hereinafter INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS 
REPORT] (surveying the market for global listings and arguing that the U.S. markets are in 
comparative competitive decline). 
 11. The movement of securities offering and trading to these alternative markets also raises 
investor equality issues as retail investors are increasingly deprived of investing opportunities. 
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primarily the anti-fraud strictures.12 For purposes of underwritten and 
widespread offerings, the principal private exemption relied upon is the 
Rule 144A exemption under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 
(Securities Act).13 Rule 144A exempts securities offerings from the resale 
restrictions of the Securities Act as long as the offering is confined to 
qualified institutional buyers.14 These buyers are generally institutional 
investors who hold more than $100 million worth of securities.15 
Historically, this market was largely comprised of non-domestic issuers 
offering equity securities in the United States, and domestic and non-
domestic issuers offering debt securities in the United States.16 However, 
the Rule 144A market for domestic issuers of equity has experienced 
extraordinary growth in recent years. Chart 1A sets forth the aggregate 
amount of equity raised by domestic issuers in initial public offerings 
versus private Rule 144A placements for the period 2000 through 2007. 
Chart 1A17 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See generally C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1119–20 (examining the treatment of sophisticated 
investors under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended). 
 13. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007). Issuers can only utilize the Rule 144A safe-harbor to offer 
securities that are not listed on a national securities exchange. Id. at § 230.144A(d)(3)(i). See 
generally Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers: Rule 144A 
Private Placements, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 159, 195 (1993) (outlining the typical structure of a Rule 
144A offering). 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. 
 15. Id.; see also Resale of Restricted Securities, Changes to Method of Determining Holding 
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862, [1989–
1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,523, at 80,641–42 (Apr. 23, 1990). 
Generally, a corporate issuer is classified under the U.S. securities laws as either a U.S. domestic 
issuer or a foreign private issuer. Foreign private issuers benefit from certain exemptions under the 
U.S. securities laws that are not available to U.S. domestic issuers. For simplicity’s sake, 
throughout this essay, foreign private issuers are also referred to as “non-U.S. companies,” “non-
U.S. issuers,” or “foreign companies” and are generally deemed to refer to foreign companies. 
 16. Technically the Rule 144A offering exemption is utilized by the underwriter. The issuer 
sells the securities to the underwriter under the private offering exemption under Section 4(2) of 
the Securities Act or Regulation D. See Trevino, supra note 13, at 173–81. 
 17. Dealogic Database, 144A & U.S. Issued IPOs (search data on file with author). 
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In 2007, Rule 144A equity offerings by domestic issuers raised $56.387 
billion, an amount greater than the $54.289 billion raised in domestic issuer 
public offerings. The bulk of the Rule 144A equity raised and included on 
Chart 1A was raised in the form of debt convertible into equity.18 Still, in 
2007 $4.5322 billion was raised in Rule 144A offerings of equity not issued 
in connection with an issuer’s initial public offering.19 
This eclipse is more evident in the non-domestic issuer market. Chart 
1B sets forth the number of, and aggregate dollar amount raised by, non-
domestic issuers in Rule 144A equity offerings compared to equity 
offerings on a U.S. securities exchange for the period 1996 through 
September 30, 2007: 
Chart 1B20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1B shows that in 2006, non-U.S. issuers engaged in initial public 
offerings raised $64.7 billion in the U.S. private equity market through Rule 
144A equity offerings, compared to only $10.8 billion in the U.S. public 
equity market.21 This disparity is one also present in the U.S. debt market, a 
place where offering activity has principally occurred in the private market. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. These amounts were in millions (rounded to nearest whole dollar amount): $33,512 (2000), 
$62,578 (2001), $23,259 (2002), $66,710 (2003), $31,023 (2004), $24,714 (2005), $52,965 
(2006), and $49,280 (2007). Dealogic Database, U.S. Issuers Issuing Under 144A (search data on 
file with author). 
 19. Id. $49.280 billion of all 144A issuances in 2007 was debt convertible into equity, $4.532 
billion was equity issued prior to the company’s initial public offering and $2.576 billion was in 
private equity issuances without an accompanying initial public offering. Id. 
 20. Dealogic Database, Rule 144A (search data on file with author). Data for 2007 through 
September 30, 2007. 
 21. Id.; see also INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 10, at x. In particular, in 
2006 global initial public offerings in the United States made via the Rule 144A exemption 
amounted to 85.7% of the U.S. value of all global initial public offerings compared to 28.96% in 
1996. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. 
PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 2 (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 
The_Competitive_Position_of_The_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC EQUITY 
MARKET REPORT]. 
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In 2007, non-domestic issuers raised $51.634 billion in Rule 144A debt 
offerings compared to only $7.13 billion on the public market.22 
This private offering activity occurs largely outside the strictures of the 
Securities Act and beyond the SEC’s supervision. Moreover, both domestic 
and non-domestic issuers can utilize exemptions to side-step the on-going 
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 
(Exchange Act) after a Rule 144A offering. For example, if a domestic 
issuer does not make a registered offering of securities, the periodic 
reporting regime under the Exchange Act is only triggered for a domestic 
issuer once it has more than $10 million in assets and a class of equity 
securities held by more than 500 holders of record.23 For non-U.S. issuers, 
Rule 12g3-2b of the Exchange Act provides an exemption to the Exchange 
Act reporting requirements.24 A non-domestic issuer who elects to furnish 
to the SEC certain information that it is otherwise required to file with its 
home regulator, and whose security is not listed or quoted on a U.S. market, 
is also exempt from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act.25 
The result of these exemptions is the emergence of a private, or 
“shadow,” securities market in the United States. It is a market increasingly 
competitive with the public one. As it grows in size, networks are being 
established to capture greater public offering activity. For example, on 
November 12, 2007, twelve investment banks and the Nasdaq announced 
the creation of a private equity securities trading platform, Portal Alliance, 
for the listing and trading of equity securities offered under Rule 144A.26 
Portal Alliance is a combination of four private securities-trading markets 
previously established by these banks and Nasdaq, and includes the 
GSTrUE market.27 The private listings markets are about to be consolidated 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Dealogic Database, Non-U.S. SEC Registered Debt & Non-U.S. 144A Debt (search 
data on file with author). See generally Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, The Impact of SEC 
Rule 144A on Corporate Debt Issuance by International Firms, 77 J. BUS. 1073 (2004) 
(describing the structure and practices of issuers in Rule 144A debt issuances). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006) (500 shareholder requirement); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2007) 
($10 million in assets requirement). 
 24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1). 
 25. Id. Generally, these exemptions are most relevant and utilized with respect to equity 
issuances. Historically, and for regulatory reasons related primarily to sales to insurance 
companies, issuers offering debt securities have typically registered their securities with the SEC 
after the offering in a process commonly known as an Exxon Capital or A/B exchange. But, in the 
new millennium this practice may be declining. One study has found that, at least in the private 
equity context, there has been an increase in the number of small- and medium-sized issuers 
choosing not to have a follow-on registration after a high-yield Rule 144A debt offering. See 
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions 5 (Univ. Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 08-003, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088830.  
 26. Press Release, NASDAQ, The PORTAL Alliance to Create Industry-Standard Facility for 
144A Equity Securities (Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/Newsroom/ 
news/newsroomnewsheadlines.aspx?year=2007. 
 27. See Reuters, 12 Firms Unite for Trading in Unregistered Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2007, at C6. 
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into a single entity, increasing liquidity and mass for this potential trading 
market. And while this market is still very much in its infancy, its goal is to 
become a significant and active trading platform for equity securities 
offered under Rule 144A.28 If it succeeds, it would create the first complete 
and active private equity securities market in the United States. It will also 
be a market largely outside the regulatory purview of the SEC and beyond 
the investing reach of retail investors. 
2. Non-U.S. Markets 
The growth of an alternative, private U.S. securities market is paralleled 
by a similar development in the international markets. The domestic 
markets of countries in both Asia and Europe are becoming more liquid and 
sizable, increasingly providing credible non-U.S. offering and listing 
options. For example, as of December 31, 2007, the aggregate domestic 
market capitalization of all European Union stock markets and the Swiss 
Exchange combined was $17.032 trillion, a figure comparable to the 
aggregate, combined market capitalization of $19.665 trillion for the NYSE 
and Nasdaq.29 Moreover, in 2007 the European Union accounted for 
30.334% of aggregate world equity trading activity.30 Leveraging on this 
strength, these non-U.S. markets have captured an increasing share of the 
global market for capital. In 2006, 381 issuers issued equity outside of their 
domestic markets.31 They raised an approximate total of $162.5 billion, of 
which only 6.6%, or $10.8 billion, was obtained through a listing on a U.S. 
exchange.32 This is a marked decline from 2000 when approximately 36.8% 
of capital raised on the global market was raised through a listing on a U.S. 
exchange.33 Chart 1C compares the total proceeds raised in initial public 
and secondary offerings on the NYSE, Nasdaq and the American Stock 
Exchange with the Main Market of London Stock Exchange (LSE), its 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and all other member exchanges of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 26. 
 29. See World Federation of Exchanges, Domestic Market Capitalization, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=396&document=4645 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 30. The NYSE and NASDAQ accounted for 44.35% of world equity trading activity during 
such period. I measure trading activity by aggregate value of trading. Calculations by author based 
on data obtained from World Federation of Exchanges, Value of Share Trading, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=396&document=4642 (last visited Mar. 
10, 2008). In addition, the share velocity of the London Stock Exchange during that month was 
154.2% compared to 167.1% on the NYSE. World Federation of Exchanges, Share Turnover 
Velocity, http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=396&document=4631 (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 31. See PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET REPORT, supra note 21, at 14 tbl.4. For these purposes these 
offerings are defined as a listing in their home country and a listing abroad, or a capital-raising via 
Rule 144A in the United States. See id. at 12. 
 32. Id. at 14 tbl.4. 
 33. Id. The U.S. share of global capital raised increases to approximately 46.5% if capital 
raised through Rule 144A offerings is included. 
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the World Federation of Exchanges during the period from 2002 through 
October 31, 2007.34 
Chart 1C 
 
The London and the Chinese markets in particular offer a strong 
competitive alternative to the United States market. In 2007, equity issuers 
raised $82.421 billion on the LSE and the AIM, and $158 billion on the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges.35 The strength of the Chinese 
market depends solely on its torrent of domestic offerings,36 but the London 
markets are a strong competitor to the United States for non-domestic 
listings. As of November 30, 2007, 682, or 21.9%, of the companies listed 
on the LSE and AIM were non-domestic issuers.37 Additionally, in 2007, 
thirty-one non-domestic issuers made initial public offerings on the LSE, 
raising approximately $22.841 billion in capital compared to the 
approximate $12.466 billion raised by fifty-two non-domestic issuers on the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. This chart was taken from PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET REPORT, supra note 21, at 6. 
 35. See World Federation of Exchanges, Investment Flows, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=396&document=4635 (last visited Mar. 9, 2008). 
 36. See James T. Areddy, Fear and Hope Rise With China’s Stocks—Market Frenzy Nurtures 
New Investors and Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2007, at A1 (stating for 2007, “Chinese stocks 
have nearly sextupled in value in just two years . . . . This year, China’s markets have had the 
world’s highest volume of shares traded, and are on track to raise the most money of any 
exchanges through stock offerings”). 
 37. Specifically, 342 non-domestic issuers were listed on the LSE and 340 non-domestic 
issuers were listed on the AIM. See London Stock Exchange, Main Market Fact Sheet 
(Dec. 2007), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/3456A612-31F8-480D-9039-
781BFF5E3323/0/MainMarketStatistics0712.xls (click tab “Summary”); London Stock Exchange, 
AIM Market Fact Sheet (Nov. 2007), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
BB2C9381-9445-4F05-8DF5-2CD006ADB84E/0/AIMMarketStatistics0711.xls (click tab “AIM 
since launch”). 
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NYSE and Nasdaq combined.38 A recent study found that, in the wake of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the increased regulatory burden and costs it 
imposes, this growth in non-domestic listings on the London markets has 
accelerated as issuers choose to list on the LSE or AIM rather than a U.S. 
stock market.39 
The rise in non-domestic listings on non-U.S. markets has important 
implications for the U.S. market. The flow of international capital and 
listings signifies the competitiveness of the United States in the global 
market.40 If the United States no longer attracts its historical proportionate 
share of listings and capital-raising it is a possible sign of its decreased 
global competitiveness.41 Moreover, these non-U.S. markets, particularly 
the LSE, are likely to continue to gain traction and build mass and volume 
as their domestic capital markets continue to grow. The recent spate of 
global stock exchange consolidation is only likely to compound this effect, 
as stock markets offer similar trading technology in different regulatory 
markets, thereby enhancing issuer portability.42 This directly implicates the 
regulatory calculus of the SEC: if issuers have viable choices outside the 
United States, U.S. regulation, even to the extent it increases social utility 
on an aggregate domestic basis, can substantially and adversely impact the 
United States’ ability to compete in the global market for capital and 
listings. 
B. INTERMEDIATION AND DERETAILIZATION 
A second phenomenon substantially affecting the U.S. capital market is 
the growing intermediation of investing.43 The rise of mutual funds, pension 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Dealogic Database, Non-U.S. Issuers Offering Stock on NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX, 
Nasdaq OTC (search data on file with author); London Stock Exchange, Main Market: Market 
Statistics, at 4 tbl.2 (Dec. 2007), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/F116BA6E-
E79A-42A6-8951-27EACC3C684B/0/Main MarketStatistics0712.pdf (U.K. pounds converted to 
U.S. dollars at $1 = ₤0.504). 
 39. See Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of 
International Listings (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987) (finding strong evidence that U.S. stock markets have 
experienced a decrease in the frequency of non-U.S. listings post-Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 40. While many argue that the U.S. is in competitive decline, the evidence is more nuanced, 
and at least part of this appears to be based on the increasing strength of alternative markets and 
the tendency of their domestic issuers to list there, rather than a decline in the United States ability 
to attract capital and listings. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 89, 148–52 (2007). 
 41. For a full discussion of this competitive threat, see INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, 
supra note 10. 
 42. The reason is that portable technology provides similar execution and trading services in 
differing regulatory jurisdictions. Such technology is important because it underpins stock market 
liquidity, a significant factor in the issuer choice of where to list. See Chris J. Brummer, Stock 
Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014683. 
 43. Intermediaries, as the term is used in this essay, means investment pools that receive funds 
for investment from retail and other investors and invest such funds on behalf of these investors. 
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funds and other intermediary institutional investors has transformed the 
investing behavior of retail investors. These investors increasingly eschew 
or are effectively closed off from direct purchase of securities and instead 
invest through intermediaries.44 This “deretailization” trend is most 
prominently illustrated by the extraordinary growth of the mutual fund 
industry. Chart 1D sets forth the number of domestic mutual funds and their 
aggregate assets under management for the period 1990 through 2006.45 
Chart 1D 
 
The aggregate assets under management of mutual funds have increased 
at an annual rate of 14.35% during this time period. And as of December 
31, 2006, the assets under management of domestic mutual funds 
comprised 54% of the combined aggregate market capitalization of the 
NYSE and Nasdaq.46 A popular perception is that the rise in mutual fund 
holdings is the product of increased utilization by investors of defined 
contribution plans, such as IRA and 401(k)s, and the mutual fund 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See generally Jeff D. Opdyke, Funds Tout Access to Top Managers—‘Manager of 
Managers’ Funds Lure Record Sums as They Increasingly Target Individual Investors, WALL ST. 
J., June 15, 2005, at D1. 
 45. See INV. CO. INST., 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 93 tbl.1 (2007), available at 
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/07_fb_table01.pdf. 
 46. Id. The combined NYSE and NASDAQ 2006 market capitalization of $19,286 trillion was 
obtained from WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, DOMESTIC MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(2007), available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/EQUITY106.pdf. 
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investment they engender.47 The rise in mutual fund holdings, though, is a 
market-wide development. A 2007 survey of households by the Investment 
Company Institute found that 43.6% of U.S. households owned mutual 
funds.48 The survey estimated that 18.9% of U.S. households held domestic 
mutual fund holdings outside of a retirement plan account.49 
Similar investing intermediation through defined benefit plans, 
commonly known as pension funds, has accompanied the rise of mutual 
funds. Chart 1E sets forth the aggregate amount invested in U.S. pension 
funds for the period 1999 through September 30, 2007.50 
Chart 1E 
A separate investment intermediation trend among private, 
sophisticated investors has mimicked the spectacular rise in public 
investment in mutual funds and pension funds. These investors can and do 
invest in mutual funds, but also have the ability to invest in capital pools 
generally unavailable to public investors, such as hedge funds and private 
equity. Chart 1F sets forth the aggregate amount invested globally in hedge 
funds for the period 1990 through 2006.51 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See INV. CO. INST., TRENDS IN OWNERSHIP OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 
(2007), available at http://www.ici.org/statements/res/fm-v16n5.pdf. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. Id. at 11. 
 50. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 
(Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/z1/Current/z1.pdf. These 
figures combine private insured pension reserves, private noninsured pension reserves and 
government insurance and pension reserves. Another significant related type of intermediate 
investing occurs through private life insurance reserve funds. As of September 30, 2007, these 
intermediary investments amounted to $1,159.30 billion. Id. at 61 tbl.L10. 
 51. Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 123 
(July 2, 2007) [hereinafter Och-Ziff Registration Statement]. 
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Chart 1F 
Historical Hedge Fund Assets Under Management and Net Asset 
Flows ($ billions) (Source: HFR Industry Reports HFR Inc. 2007) 
Pension funds and other intermediaries are also significant investors in 
hedge funds and other private capital pools such as private equity funds.52 
This investment is often also intermediated through funds-of-funds—funds 
created to invest in other hedge funds or private equity funds.53 Individual, 
sophisticated investors often do not meet the minimum investment 
qualifications for a hedge fund or private equity fund, and therefore also 
invest in funds-of-funds with lower investment requirements.54 Hedge 
funds-of-funds likely comprise more than half of the invested capital in 
hedge funds, and as of year-end 2007 it was estimated that globally, hedge 
funds-of-funds with greater than $1 billion in assets under management 
held approximately $1.1 trillion in assets.55 
The source of investment and investors for each of these intermediaries 
is different. However, their dominant presence in the U.S. capital markets 
spells a secular trend of deretailization and the diminishing relevance of the 
retail investor. Public securities are now increasingly held through 
intermediaries and other private funds, such as endowment and sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Deborah Solomon, Congress May Let Hedge Funds Manage More Pension Money, 
WALL ST. J., July 28, 2006, at A1. 
 53. See Richard K. Lai, Why Funds of Funds? 5–8 (Feb. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=676999) (examining the financial and economic incentives 
engendering the utilization of funds of funds); see also Anne Tergesen, The Manic Market: An 
Investor’s Guide: As Hedge Funds Grow, Their Walls Don’t Look So High, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
1997, at C11 (reporting that sophisticated investors with lower net worth often invest in funds of 
funds because they “often have lower minimums than other funds do”). 
 54. See Tergesen, supra note 53. 
 55. See Fund of Hedge Funds Assets Grew by One-Third in 2007, Says Survey, 
HEDGEWEEK.COM, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/detail.jsp?content_id= 
243020&livehome=true. 
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wealth funds, rather than by retail investors. As a result, one recent study 
found that retail investors, who once owned more than 90% of publicly 
traded equity, now own less than 30%.56 Retail investors are simply no 
longer the mainstay of the public markets and are unlikely to return to this 
position. 
The dominance of private, sophisticated investors over the securities 
markets affects capital flows in the securities offering market. First, the rise 
of the Rule 144A market57 is in part due to the increased number of 
intermediaries available to purchase securities in this market. More 
generally, these intermediaries provide a significant source of capital 
outside the public securities offering process. Second, the greater resources 
available to these intermediaries can reduce agency costs to the extent these 
intermediaries provide a gatekeeper function and otherwise agitate for 
corporate value creation.58 Finally, greater intermediary investment should 
theoretically lead to reduced market volatility and speculation as investing 
decisions shift from retail investors who do not generally have the 
professional investment skill to intermediaries with such talent.59 
Each intermediary type also has unique, consequential effects on the 
market. For example, private equity offers public companies an option to 
exit the public markets entirely; subsequent capital requirements for the 
company can also be met in the private markets through other 
intermediaries or financial institutions, placing the company largely outside 
the purview of the federal securities laws and SEC oversight.60 Hedge fund 
trading provides deep liquidity to both the equity and the derivatives 
markets.61 Hedge funds also often serve as activist investors and counter-
parties in highly complex financial transactions, which other regulated 
financial entities, such as banks, may lack the ability to do.62 Meanwhile, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Cartwright Speech, supra note 9. 
 57. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 58. See generally Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and 
Institutional Investors (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
05-20, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227. As Professor Bainbridge notes, this 
potential is far from realized at this date. 
 59. Cf. Ramin Baghai-Wadji & Stefan Klocker, Performance and Style Shifts in the Hedge 
Fund Industry 3–4 (Feb. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920444) (finding hedge funds with poor performance improved their 
returns in subsequent periods after changes in investment style). 
 60. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 82/2007, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114. 
 61. See Timothy F. Geithner, Keynote Address at the National Conference on the Securities 
Industry: Hedge Funds and Their Implications for the Financial System (Nov. 17, 2004), available 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2004/gei041117.html. 
 62. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 
1427 (2007) (finding that hedge fund shareholder interventions “neither amount to near-term 
holdups nor revive the 1980s leveraged restructuring”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (Vanderbilt Univ., Law and Economics Research 
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pension funds have been accused of making investment decisions based on 
inappropriate political considerations to the possible detriment of their 
beneficiaries.63 
The presence of these intermediaries and their effect on the capital 
markets shift the calculus for securities regulation. The Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act are designed to protect retail investors.64 Yet, if 
sophisticated intermediaries now undertake the bulk of investing, the 
protections of these Acts become procedural, and the opportunities for 
deregulation increase. More specifically, if investors in public offerings and 
public securities are largely sophisticated intermediaries, the protections 
required by the federal securities laws can arguably be left in some measure 
to private bargaining, with intermediaries serving as agents for the public 
investor stub, if any.65 In these circumstances, compliance with the federal 
securities laws becomes, to some extent, an unnecessary transaction cost.66 
Intermediaries also provide a strong alternative supply of private capital to 
issuers who wish to avoid the costs associated with registration, the scrutiny 
of the public offering process generally, and on-going public reporting 
obligations. As the private securities market develops further, these 
intermediaries and the structures created to accommodate them, and the 
private offering market generally, create a more viable alternative to an 
offering on the U.S. public markets.67 Finally, these intermediaries create 
                                                                                                                 
Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907 (examining a dataset of 
hedge fund activism in the United States during the period 2001 through 2005 and finding that 
hedge funds act as value investors and shareholder advocates). Hedge fund innovation may have a 
down-side though: increasing complexity and systematic risk. See generally RICHARD 
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS AND THE PERILS OF 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION (2007). 
 63. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, 
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1018 (1998). But see Gordon L. Clark & Tessa M. Hebb, Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: 
The Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 192 (2004). 
 64. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (2006). 
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is 
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. 
Id. 
 65. However, such laws may still provide value in maintaining investor confidence and 
preventing rent-seeking by these agents themselves. See generally Frank B. Cross & Robert A. 
Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333 (2006) 
(examining the positive effects of regulation on stock markets). 
 66. While theoretically feasible, political realities and the SEC focus on its core mission of 
protecting the public investor may prevent any such deregulation. 
 67. Issuers, though, may still be incentivized to maintain a public listing of their securities, 
since regulatory restrictions may limit the extent to which an intermediary may invest in non-
public or illiquid securities. For example, the Investment Company Act stipulates that generally an 
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regulatory-supervision concerns. Mutual funds are subject to direct 
supervision by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(Investment Company Act),68 but hedge funds in part exist outside the 
regulatory purview of the SEC,69 while pension funds are regulated by the 
Department of Labor,70 and other private capital pools, such as endowment 
funds and sovereign wealth funds, are largely unregulated.71 The 
consequence is, not only is a significant portion of the U.S. capital market 
increasingly outside the federal securities laws, but many influential market 
investors that raise their own unique issues also exist apart from SEC 
oversight.72 The ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the securities 
markets is correspondingly made more difficult. 
C. MARKET INNOVATION AND SOPHISTICATION 
Capital markets are increasingly sophisticated and complex due to the 
quickening pace of financial innovation. Rapid advances in finance, both 
structural and theoretical, have enhanced the capacity of market participants 
to create and price financial products.73 Market actors consequently have 
increased ability and latitude to allocate risk and corporate capital. This 
investing model provides differing, more viable avenues for raising capital 
in alternative markets and financial products, and it is causing a rethink of 
previous assumptions and practices concerning an issuer’s need to access 
the public equity markets. It has also created a host of new issues for 
                                                                                                                 
open-ended investment company may not hold fifteen percent or more of its assets in illiquid 
securities. See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
18,612, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,930, at 82,477 (Mar. 12, 
1992). A security is considered “illiquid” if a fund is unable to promptly sell or dispose of the 
security in the ordinary course of business at its current value within seven days. 15 U.S.C.A. § 
80a-59(b) (2006); see Acquisition and Valuation of Certain Portfolio Instruments by Registered 
Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 14,983, [1985–1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,972 (Mar. 21, 1986). Alternative stock markets, such as Portal Alliance, 
are an important predicate to creating such an alternative market because if they succeed they can 
provide a private alternative source of liquidity engendering a more complete market. See supra 
notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 68. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
 69. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Adviser 
Registration Adopting Release]. 
 70. See 29 C.F.R. § 2530 (2007). 
 71. Sovereign wealth funds in particular raise their own national security and investing 
efficiency issues. See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, A Fear of Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2007, at C1; Steven M. Davidoff, Telling Friend From Foe in Sovereign Investments, 
DEALBOOK, Apr. 2, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/telling-friend-from-foe-
in-foreign-investments/. 
 72. These investors are still subject to the general requirements of the federal securities laws. 
The question is whether their influence, size and nature warrant particular oversight. 
 73. See Eleanor Laise, Mutual Funds Add Exotic Fare to the Mix—Many Are Making 
Increasing Use of Complex Derivatives to Enhance Performance, but the Strategies Carry Risks, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2007, at D1 (discussing the increasing use of complex financial products by 
mutual funds). 
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regulators grappling with the complexity and rapid, innovative development 
of these products.74 
The rise of the U.S. derivatives market is a primary example of these 
advances. As of June 30, 2007, the aggregate notional value of derivatives 
in the United States was $347.1 trillion, compared to $865.6 billion in 
1987.75 This is a market that exists due to the efforts of a core group of 
academics and financial professionals who invented the mathematical 
arsenal to price and structure these derivatives.76 The U.S. derivatives 
market is increasingly flexible and complex: It consists of not just forwards, 
futures, and options on equities and commodities, but derivatives are now 
priced and issued on a variety of more sophisticated and harder-to-price 
assets and events, such as property and weather.77 The credit derivative 
market, which consists of products designed to allocate credit risk and 
lubricate credit markets, has become a particularly valuable component of 
the U.S. capital market. As the products increase in variety and complexity, 
they increase the ability of financial institutions to extend credit.78 As of 
June 30, 2007, there was $45,464.50 billion in outstanding credit default 
swaps, compared to $631.50 billion as of June 30, 2001.79 This is an annual 
growth rate of 100%. 
More tellingly, these products and markets have the potential to lessen 
the need for issuers to access the public equity markets. The use of 
derivatives for hedging purposes can stabilize capital flows and make credit 
or other alternative capital a more viable source for funding needs against 
the transaction and other costs associated with public equity. As Professors 
Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead have recently theorized, financial 
alchemy may now be sufficiently advanced to structure and discretely 
                                                                                                                 
 74. This essay focuses on these issues in the context of capital-raising. But the new capital 
markets paradigm is allowing actors to use derivatives to perhaps unduly affect corporate 
takeovers and proxy votes under the radar of historical SEC requirements. See Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, A Loophole Lets a Foot in the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at C1; see also Henry T. 
C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
 75. International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA Market Survey Results, 
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2007) [hereinafter ISDA Market Survey Results]. 
 76. For a good history see PERRY MEHRLING, FISCHER BLACK AND THE REVOLUTIONARY 
IDEA OF FINANCE (2005). 
 77. For example, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices measure changes in the value of 
the U.S. residential real estate market (on a weighted composite index), as well as in ten specific 
metropolitan regions across the United States. Futures contracts based on these indices are traded 
on the CME Group derivatives exchange. See CME GROUP, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE 
INDICES FUTURES AND OPTIONS: INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.cme.com/files/cmehousing_brochure.pdf. 
 78. See Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the 
Conference on Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives: Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit 
Derivatives (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
kohn20070322a.htm. 
 79. ISDA Market Survey Results, supra note 75. 
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separate issuer risk such that public equity capital is no longer necessary or 
desirable in many circumstances.80 Public equity may lose its historical 
place as the lowest-cost risk-bearer in light of derivative market 
alternatives.81 Professors Gilson and Whitehead ultimately attribute the rise 
of the private equity market to these developments, and predict that issuers 
may decreasingly access the public markets for equity capital as a result.82 
The rapidity of financial innovation and the related consequences create 
at least four regulatory issues.83 First, these products are often difficult to 
regulate—their complexity and risk are hard to comprehend and dissect.84 
The current sub-prime mortgage crisis and apparent mispricing of 
collateralized debt obligations based on these mortgage securities aptly 
illustrate the systemic and regulatory issues associated with more complex 
financial instruments. Second, to the extent federal securities regulation is 
rule- rather than principle-based, it is less responsive to rapid changes in the 
structure and nature of the capital markets.85 Moreover, there is a 
permanence to this gap as adaptation to new regulation is immediate due to 
financial innovation, but the regulatory process takes years to respond. 
This innovation can also create issues that defy regulation. For 
example, a number of academics have recently published papers setting 
forth models for creation of synthetic hedge funds.86 Skillful retail investors 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, 
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 235 (2008). Professors 
Gilson and Whitehead echo Michael Jensen’s famous article in the 1980’s heralding the eclipse of 
the publicly traded corporation. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989 (rev. 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149. 
 81. Financial innovation can also substitute for other public company benefits. For example, 
prediction markets may provide equivalent informational benefits to that of public equity markets. 
See Michael B. Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007); Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and 
the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock 
Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589 (2003). 
 82. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 80, at 236; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the 
Uncorporation (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003790 (discussing the 
implications of the increasing utilization of firms that include key partnership-type features on the 
future of firms and regulation of uncorporate forms). 
 83. The increasing information provided and understanding gained by ever-more sophisticated 
academic study of the capital markets also provides the SEC with greater ability to intelligently 
regulate markets. 
 84. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwartz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (highlighting the increasing complexity of public disclosure 
and concomitant inability of investors, even sophisticated ones, to properly comprehend and 
analyze this information). 
 85. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based 
Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 
1446–53 (2007). 
 86. See, e.g., Harry M. Kat & Helder Palaro, “FUNDCREATOR”: Reply to the Critics (Alt. 
Inv. Research Centre, Working Paper No. 0041, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017873; Harry M. Kat & Helder P. Palaro, Who Needs Hedge Funds?: 
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can now make investments “akin” to having actually invested in their own 
hedge funds.87 Yet, the SEC has adamantly maintained that hedge fund 
investments should be “off-limits” to public investors.88 If hedge funds are 
indeed too risky for retail investment, presumably virtual investments like 
synthetic hedge funds are as well. How does the SEC regulate to prohibit 
virtual investments such as a synthetic hedge fund? There is likely no 
way.89 
Third, direct federal regulation of the U.S. securities markets is in large 
measure allocated between the SEC and the Commodities Futures and 
Trade Commission (CFTC). The CFTC generally regulates non-equity 
derivatives while the SEC regulates equity derivatives and securities, and 
each has a separate regulatory regime.90 An informed and rational economic 
market actor therefore has latitude to structure publicly traded products to 
arbitrage between SEC or CFTC regulation, depending upon the regulatory 
costs imposed.91 Moreover, the rise of derivatives generally and the CFTC’s 
expanding domain has limited the SEC or any one regulator’s ability to 
completely supervise the U.S. capital markets. This trend may affect the 
SEC particularly, as the increased ability of issuers to manage risk and 
capital needs through derivatives as an alternative to public equity capital 
increasingly deprives the SEC of jurisdiction over corporate capital 
raising.92 
Finally, financial innovation means that the simple prohibition or 
confining regulation of a financial product is no longer a panacea if demand 
for the security continues. Creative finance professionals will simply offer 
substitute financial products that mimic the prohibited or restricted 
investment. For example, the rise in special purpose acquisition companies 
(SPACs) can be attributed in large part to financial innovators utilizing a 
                                                                                                                 
A Copula-Based Approach to Hedge Fund Return Replication (Alt. Inv. Research Centre, 
Working Paper No. 0027, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=855424. 
 87. Professors Kat and Palaro are now marketing their hedge fund replication technique, 
known as FundCreator, to the general public. See Fundcreator.com, http://www.fundcreator.com/ 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 88. See infra Part II.A. 
 89. See also Andrew Lo & Pankai Patel, 130/30: The New Long-Only, at 8–13 (Dec. 11, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1074622) (proposing two 
long-short investing index strategies showing increased benefits over a static S&P 500 index 
investment). 
 90. See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities 
Regulation, 14 YALE J. REG. 279 (1997). 
 91. The fractured nature of U.S. financial services regulation provides ample opportunity for 
arbitrage beyond that of CFTC and SEC regulation and jurisdiction; one count puts at 115 the 
number of state and federal agencies involved in regulating some aspect of financial services. See 
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States 
Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4). 
 92. In light of the current credit crisis, the Treasury Department has proposed merging the 
CFTC and SEC. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 11 (Mar. 2008).  
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financial product to side-step prohibitory regulation on private equity funds 
offering their investments to the public.93 
II. SEC REGULATORY FAILURE IN THE NEW PARADIGM 
The new regulatory paradigm is one of complexity and dilemma for the 
SEC. Market proliferation, intermediary investing, deretailization and 
increased financial innovation combine with other emergent forces to create 
strong alternatives for raising capital.94 Issuers are no longer largely 
confined to the public markets for equity and other capital-raising. The SEC 
rule-making process is thus subject to greater competitive force. Prohibitory 
or unduly burdensome securities regulation will simply cause capital and 
capital-raising to migrate to alternative markets. Additionally, substitute 
financial products can now be devised to circumvent and arbitrage SEC 
regulation. Beyond these forces, the entire structure and content of SEC 
regulation is possibly in question. This is particularly true if public equity 
markets are entering a revolutionary transformational stage where, by 
definition, they are no longer the optimal place to list and raise capital, and 
public equity capital and listings are no longer a necessity or even desirable 
capital provider or lowest-cost risk-bearer. The paradigm shift is real and 
consequential. 
Yet, the SEC has largely refused to acknowledge these developments. 
Instead, the SEC appears to be focused on tending the current code and 
regulating as it has historically, without heed to the new paradigm. The 
result is regulation that is increasingly inapposite and which fails to 
adequately account for the increased mobility and sources of capital and the 
changed structure of the U.S. capital markets generally. A full analysis of 
SEC regulatory practices and their drivers is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Nonetheless, the problems and tensions with recent SEC rulemaking and 
the effect of the new capital market paradigm can be highlighted by 
examining the recent SEC regulatory experience with hedge funds.95 
A. HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
In the last forty years, hedge funds have become increasingly prominent 
fixtures of the U.S. capital market. As of year-end 2006, it was estimated 
                                                                                                                 
 93. “SPACS are companies organized to purchase one or more operating businesses. The 
equity funds to acquire these businesses come from an initial public offering by the SPAC.” 
Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript at 34). For a further discussion of these vehicles and the effect of SEC regulation on 
the demand and structure of this financial product, see id. 
 94. See discussion supra Part I. 
 95. The SEC has sometimes inexplicably refused to embrace modern regulatory technique and 
cost-benefit analysis. See Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: 
Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006). 
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that there were 9,462 hedge funds.96 Yet, until this millennium, SEC 
regulatory attention to these capital pools was, at least publicly, limited.97 
Then, in 1998 the global macro hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) spectacularly imploded. The collapse of LTCM not 
only resulted in a $4.6 billion loss for its investors but imperiled the 
stability of the entire global capital market.98 This event unleashed a host of 
regulatory forces spurring the SEC to more closely scrutinize and attempt to 
regulate hedge funds. 
In 2004, these developments culminated with SEC action. The SEC 
Commissioners voted 3-2 to adopt Rule 203(b)(3)-2 under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act),99 which requires almost all domestic 
hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC.100 New Rule 203(b)(3)-2 
amended prior SEC Rule 203(b)(3), which had permitted an adviser to 
count each fund it advised as a client, thereby side-stepping SEC 
registration requirements.101 Under the amended rule, investment advisers 
meeting the definition of “private funds” would generally be required to 
look through their advised funds and count each investor, as opposed to 
each fund, as a client to determine whether the adviser was required to 
register.102 The rule required the majority of qualifying hedge fund advisers 
to register by February 1, 2006.103 However, on June 23, 2006 the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the new rule, on the 
grounds that the SEC’s “interpretation of the word ‘client’ comes close to 
violating the plain language of the statute,” and was arbitrary.104 
In response to the D.C. Circuit decision, the SEC abandoned its attempt 
to require hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act.105 Instead, 
in 2006, the SEC proposed to tighten the restrictions on the type of 
investors who could invest in hedge funds. The SEC proposed that the 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Och-Ziff Registration Statement, supra note 51, at 122 (citing Hedge Fund Research 
http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/). This is compared to an estimate of sixty-eight active hedge 
funds in 1984. FRANÇOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: MYTHS AND LIMITS 8 (2002). For a 
detailed history of hedge funds in the United States, see id. at 7–12. 
 97. SEC STAFF, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, at app.A (2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (detailing the history of SEC review and 
regulation of hedge funds). 
 98. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). 
 99. See Adviser Registration Adopting Release, supra note 69; see also Dissent of 
Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to the Registration Under the Advisers 
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,089 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Adviser 
Registration Dissent]. 
 100. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2007). 
 101. Adviser Registration Adopting Release, supra note 69, at 72,065–66. 
 102. Id. at 72,070. 
 103. Id. at 72,077. 
 104. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 105. Press Release, SEC, Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in Phillip Goldstein et al. v. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm. 
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definition of accredited investor under Regulation D be amended for 
“investment pools” (i.e., hedge funds) that rely on the Rule 3(c)(1) 
exemption from registration under the Investment Company Act.106 
Previously, an investor need only have had an aggregate net worth of $1 
million dollars or an individual income which exceeded $200,000 (or joint 
income with the person’s spouse exceeding $300,000) in each of the two 
most recent years to qualify as an accredited investor under Regulation D, 
and permit them to invest in a Rule 3(c)(1) hedge fund or private equity 
fund.107 The proposed rule would revise the definition of accredited investor 
so that a natural person could qualify and be allowed to invest in hedge 
funds only if he or she met the previous tests of net worth or income, and 
owned at least $2.5 million in investments.108 
These attempts by the SEC at hedge fund regulation have been 
criticized as both schizophrenic and irrational.109 In its first regulatory 
foray, the SEC attempted to address systemic issues of risk and 
transparency by requiring hedge fund advisers to submit to SEC oversight 
and regulation by registering under the Advisers Act.110 Yet, system-wide 
risk issues are largely the regulatory purview of the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve, and the latter notably opposed this regulation.111 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited 
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Exchange Act Release No. 8766, [2006 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,736, at 84,047–48 (Dec. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Accredited 
Investor Proposing Release]. 
 107. The individual can also have joint income with his or her spouse in excess of $300,000 to 
qualify. In addition, the individual must have a reasonable expectation of reaching the same 
income level in the current year. Id. at 84,047. The rule is embodied in Rule 501 of the Securities 
Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2007). In addition to relying upon the Rule 506 offering exemption 
within Regulation D, funds also sometimes rely upon Rule 506’s statutory foundation, Section 
4(2), for their Securities Act offering exemption. See generally Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1120–
24 (discussing the structure of securities registration exemptions). The SEC is currently 
considering raising these investment thresholds. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in 
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 
[2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,939, at 85,171 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
 108. See Accredited Investor Proposing Release, supra note 105, at 84,048. The SEC also 
proposed in this release a new antifraud rule under the Advisers Act to clarify, in light of the 
Goldstein decision, the SEC’s ability to bring enforcement actions under the Advisers Act against 
investment advisers who defraud investors or prospective investors in a hedge fund or other 
pooled investment vehicle. Id. at 84,042–43. The SEC adopted this rule on July 11, 2007. See 
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Investment Adviser Act 
Release No. 2628, [2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,937, at 85,157 (Aug. 3, 
2007). 
 109. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and 
Why of Securities Regulation 20 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Faculty Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 07-05-01, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984450. 
 110. The SEC relied heavily on the possibility of hedge fund adviser fraud to justify its adviser 
registration rule. However, the SEC was only able to cite fifty-one enforcement actions for hedge 
fund adviser misconduct. See Adviser Registration Adopting Release, supra note 98, at 81,494. 
 111. See Rachel McTague, Hedge Funds: Greenspan Expresses Concern over SEC Hedge Fund 
Proposal, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 30, 2004). The SEC has also skirted this bar by arguing that 
small investors are now widely invested in hedge funds through intermediaries such as pension 
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registration requirements the SEC sought to impose were equivalent to 
CFTC regulations at the time applicable to a majority of hedge funds.112 
The SEC then abandoned these concerns in its latest rule proposals, 
instead shifting its regulatory focus to protection of investors, a core 
mission.113 However, the rationale of this tactical change is equally 
puzzling. To justify placing further restrictions on the type of investor that 
can invest in hedge funds, the SEC stated: 
Not only do private pools often use complicated investment strategies, but 
there is minimal information available about them in the public domain. 
Accordingly, investors may not have access to the kind of information 
provided through our system of securities registration and therefore may 
find it difficult to appreciate the unique risks of these pools . . . .114 
Nowhere did the SEC cite a single financial or academic study about 
the problems or financial benefits of hedge funds to justify this statement 
or, indeed, the Rule itself. Instead, the SEC has steadfastly refused to 
contemplate public investment in hedge funds. Its regulatory approach is to 
further restrict public investment, justifying this action on the grounds that 
hedge funds are too “risky” for public investors.115 But the SEC has failed 
to conduct any studies or other cost-benefit analysis of public investment in 
hedge funds or cite any research on this issue to support its position. If they 
did so, they would find that there are a number of benefits to public 
investment in hedge funds, including the historical ability of some of these 
funds to earn extraordinary risk-adjusted positive returns, as compared with 
other investment classes and strategies.116 Other ostensible benefits include 
                                                                                                                 
funds, justifying its regulatory jurisdiction. See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks 
Before the Investment Counsel Association of America (Apr. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042204whd.htm [hereinafter SEC Speech]. The SEC does 
have a collective voice in regulating systemic risk through the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets. 
 112. See Adviser Registration Dissent, supra note 98, at 81,531–32. The CFTC raised strong 
concerns with the SEC’s proposed rule on this and other grounds. See Letter from Sharon Brown-
Hruska, Acting Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, to Chairman Donaldson 
and Commissioners of the SEC (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s73004/sbhruska102204.pdf. 
 113. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (2006). 
 114. See Accredited Investor Proposing Release, supra note 105, at 84,053. 
 115. See, e.g., Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 
Securities Act Release No. 8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, at 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (proposing “a 
new category of accredited investor . . . designed to help ensure that investors in these types of 
funds are capable of evaluating and bearing the risks of their investments”). 
 116. See Roger G. Ibbotson & Peng Chen, The A, B, Cs of Hedge Funds: Alphas, Betas, and 
Costs 12–13 (Yale Int’l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=733264 (finding that hedge fund alphas were significantly positive at 
3.04% in a sample of almost 3,000 hedge funds from the TASS database during the period 
January 1995 through April 2006); see also Daniel Capocci & Georges Hübner, Analysis of Hedge 
Fund Performance, 11 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 55 (2004); Robert Kosowski, Naryan Y. Naik & Melvin 
Too, Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A Bayesian and Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 229 
(2007); William Fung et al., Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk and Capital Formation 3 (July 
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diversification, more managed risk, and the ability to leverage capital at a 
lower interest rate than the average investor would otherwise be capable of 
or have access to.117 The SEC has yet to consider or even acknowledge any 
of these benefits in its hedge fund rulemaking. 
Professor Troy Paredes has ably written on the regulatory forces driving 
the SEC’s hedge fund regulation and its economic failures.118 He attributes 
SEC regulatory action to a precautionary principle approach effected by 
cognitive psychology and the political economy of public demand.119 SEC 
fears of future hedge fund collapses, possible capital markets disruption, 
and the investor losses these events may engender have been exacerbated 
by the availability heuristic.120 Consequently, the SEC has adopted a 
precautionary approach towards regulation of hedge funds, despite the 
absence of certain evidence on their risk parameter and the regulatory cost 
of such action.121 The SEC is also painfully aware of the public criticism it 
received for its inaction and failure to properly regulate and supervise the 
U.S. capital market in the wake of the Enron/WorldCom scandals.122 The 
result was congressional action in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.123 
SEC regulation of hedge funds thus has a classic political-economy 
rationale: It creates an appearance that the SEC is proactively responding to 
the perceived hedge fund risk and is responsive to congressional and 
popular interest in hedge funds. An alternative course would likely have 
raised further congressional ire and resulted in adverse consequences for the 
SEC, such as reduced funding and prestige.124 
There are also other, complementary explanations in addition to the 
regulatory forces Professor Paredes cites. Regulation of hedge funds 
comports with the SEC’s aggrandizing and expansionist regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=778124). But see Henry M. 
Kat & Joëlle Miffre, The Impact of Non-Normality Risks and Tactical Trading on Hedge Fund 
Alphas 4 (May 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424368) 
(analyzing prior studies of hedge fund performance and finding that they overstate hedge fund 
alpha on average by 1.54%). 
 117. See generally Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Regulatory Reform to Create a 
U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 
2008). 
 118. Paredes, supra note 108; see also Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge 
Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006) 
[hereinafter Paredes, On the Decision]. 
 119. Paredes, On the Decision, supra note 117, at 1006–10. 
 120. Id. at 1010–16. 
 121. Paredes, supra note 108, at 18 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1020–29 (2005)). 
 122. See Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks at Investor Summit (May 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch560.htm. 
 123. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005). 
 124. Paredes, On the Decision, supra note 117, at 1010–15. 
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tendencies.125 Hedge fund activities historically have been largely beyond 
SEC purview. SEC attempts at hedge fund regulation represent a move to 
seize regulatory turf from other agencies responsible for supervising the 
system-wide effects of hedge funds.126 Similarly, the SEC’s conduct has 
monopolistic attributes: the Agency appears unaware of the costs of its 
regulation, without comprehension of existing competitive forces and 
alternatives.127 
There are also other political-economy explanations for the SEC’s 
conduct. Regulating hedge funds allows the SEC to petition Congress for 
increased appropriations and staffing to implement such regulation. 
Furthermore, the SEC’s approach pays heed to the general public’s oft-
expressed fear of these investments as complex, high risk, and a disruptive 
and negative presence on the U.S. capital market.  
The exact mix of these forces is debatable, but it is clear that the SEC 
never overtly appeared to be acting in response to, or with 
acknowledgement of, the new capital markets paradigm.128 
B. HEDGE FUND CONSEQUENCES 
Historically, the SEC’s prohibitory regulation of public investment in 
hedge funds would likely suffice to address the above concerns. Retail 
investors effectively would be barred from hedge fund investment and 
would no longer be exposed to their labeled, unsuitable risks. However, the 
new regulatory paradigm compromises the effectiveness of SEC regulation. 
Ordinary investors still demand hedge fund investments due to their 
perceived unique and compelling benefits.129 The financial market in the 
new paradigm responds to this demand by engineering permitted 
investments with characteristics that mimic hedge funds.130 Retail investors 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 148–53 (1967) (setting forth the 
“Law of Ever Expanding Control: The quantity and detail of reporting required by monitoring 
bureaus tends to rise steadily over time, regardless of the amount or nature of the activity being 
monitored.”). 
 126. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group 
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 916 (1994) 
(“[I]nstitutional biases . . . provide the best criteria for predicting agency behavior.”). 
 127. This regulatory monopoly position produces an incentive to over-regulate. See Roberta 
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. 
L. 387, 392–93 (2001). 
 128. Nonetheless, it would appear that certain of these forces are dominant. If the SEC were to 
permit public offering of hedge funds it would also sustain an aggrandizement explanation as well 
as one species of the political economy explanation due to the increased resources the SEC would 
require to implement such a regime. We can therefore surmise that the forces delineated above, 
which sustain restricted investment in hedge funds, are the primary drivers of regulation. 
 129. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 115. 
 130. I term these substitute investments “black market capital” and have written extensively on 
this phenomenon in Black Market Capital, a companion piece to this essay. See Davidoff, supra 
note 92. Investors also purchase these investments through surreptitious means on a true black 
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may also seek alternative markets, whether private or foreign, to make 
hedge fund investments. Finally, retail investors may be prohibited from 
investing directly in hedge funds but ultimately still become materially 
exposed to this risk, to the extent it exists, through intermediary 
investments. The end result is that the SEC’s hedge fund regulatory 
purpose—limiting retail investor exposure to hedge fund risk—is 
circumvented. And this is exactly what has happened. The remainder of this 
Part sets forth a number of examples. 
1. Hedge Fund Substitute Products 
Recent hedge fund adviser initial public offerings illustrate the ability 
of market actors faced with prohibitory regulation to structure financial 
products side-stepping this bar. Hedge fund advisers are simply that: they 
are the corporate entities that create and administer the actual hedge and 
private equity funds. Their revenue and profit is derived principally from 
the so-called “two-and-twenty”—the typical 2% administrative fee that the 
adviser charges with respect to assets under management, and a 20% profit-
sharing fee with respect to fund profits over a pre-set hurdle rate.131 As 
such, their performance is derivative of the funds they advise.132 The 
success or failure of a fund adviser is thus almost wholly dependent upon 
the fortunes of their underlying funds. However, hedge funds themselves 
are effectively barred from making a public offering because of restrictions 
imposed by the Investment Company Act133 and the Advisers Act.134 Yet, 
unlike the funds themselves, hedge fund advisers do not automatically come 
under the aegis of these Acts for purposes of these restrictions. Rather, 
since they are companies whose business happens to be advising hedge 
funds, they are treated under the federal securities laws as normal operating 
companies. Consequently, these advisers can publicly raise capital without 
triggering the application of the Investment Company Act and can 
otherwise avoid the relevant Advisers Act restrictions on fees.135 
Hedge fund adviser initial public offerings thus offer a viable 
alternative for retail investors to derivatively invest in hedge funds. Market 
actors have embraced this alternative structure. In 2007, there were three 
                                                                                                                 
market. They alternatively make foreign purchases where these public investments are legally 
permitted. 
 131. See generally DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS §§ 15.1, 
15.2 (2005). 
 132. These advisers also do earn revenue through direct investment in their funds themselves; 
this is a revenue-stream wholly dependent on fund performance. 
 133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
 135. See generally After Blackstone: Should Small Investors Be Exposed to Risks of Hedge 
Funds?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (July 11, 2007) (testimony of Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. 
Mgmt., SEC). 
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hedge fund adviser initial public offerings.136 These advisers raised an 
aggregate amount of $5.186 billion, comprising 9.2% of the U.S. initial 
public offering market during this time period.137 The market has succeeded 
in providing a substitute product for hedge funds, which the SEC does not 
regulate in a similar manner. 
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and indexes that have been created to 
track hedge fund performance are also marketed to retail investors as 
“hedge fund” substitutes, providing such investors the ability to capture the 
benefits of hedge funds.138 In the United States there are multiple single 
strategy “hedge fund-type” ETFs.139 Many investment advisers now 
recommend that clients use these single-product ETFs if they want to “build 
their own” hedge funds.140 These ETFs are also often based on index 
products that attempt to achieve similar returns. It is now estimated that 
there are twenty-one such indexes for hedge funds.141 
                                                                                                                 
 136. These were Fortress Investment Group, GLG Partners, Inc., and Och-Ziff Capital 
Management Group. See Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Group, Prospectus (Form 424B4), at cover & 1 
(Nov. 13, 2007); Freedom Acquisition Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5 
(Oct. 12, 2007); Fortress Investment Group LLC, Prospectus (Form 424B4), at cover & 1 (Feb. 8, 
2007). This figure does not include American Real Estate Partners L.P.’s August 9, 2007 
agreement to acquire for approximately $900 million Carl C. Icahn’s interests in the management 
company and general partners of the Icahn Funds, which as of June 30, 2007 had approximately 
$7 billion in assets under management. See American Real Estate Partners L.P., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Aug. 9, 2007). The transaction was generally viewed as an alternative way for this 
fund adviser to go public. 
 137. Aggregate initial public offering proceeds for 2007 were $65.34 billion. See Dealogic 
Database, U.S. Listed IPOs (search data on file with author). 
 138. An example is the family of ProShares ETFs. See Rob Wherry, These ETFs Bring Hedge-
Fund Tactics to the Mainstream, SMARTMONEY, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/ 
etffocus/?story=20070131; Daisy Maxey, Open & Shut: Hedging Bets—ETF Industry Joins the 
Mutual-Fund World in Employing a Trendy Hedge Fund Technique, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at 
R2. 
 139. A perusal of the full list of all existent ETFs finds numerous “hedge fund-type” ETFs such 
as iPath JPY/USD Exchange Rate ETN, Oil Services HOLDRs, and PowerShares DWA 
Technical Leaders. For a full list of U.S.-listed ETFs, see Morningstar, Inc., ETF Performance, 
Exchange Traded Funds: All, http://news.morningstar.com/etf/lists/ETFReturns.html?topNum= 
All&lastRecNum=1000&curField=8&fsection=etfs&lpos=FindAMutualFund (last visited Mar. 
24, 2008). 
 140. See, e.g., Timothy Middleton, Build Your Own Hedge Fund, MSN MONEY, Jan. 24, 2006,  
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P140363.asp; Carl T. Delfeld, Build Your Own Global ETF 
Hedge Portfolio, SEEKING ALPHA, Mar. 9, 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/28993-build-
your-own-global-etf-hedge-portfolio. 
 141. An example is the Merrill Lynch Equity Volatility Arbitrage Index, which attempts to 
replicate the returns of an S&P 500 volatility arbitrage strategy and has a related ETF. See Press 
Release, Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch Creates “Equity Volatility Arbitrage Index” to Replicate 
Hedge Fund Strategy (Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_ 
8149_74412_75268_75377. One estimate currently puts the number of hedge fund indexes at 
twenty-one. See The Hedge Fund Marketing Alliance, Hedge Fund Indexes, 
http://www.hedgefundmarketing.org/hedgefundindexes.htm (last visited  Mar. 24, 2008). See 
generally François-Serge Lhabitant, Hedge Fund Indices for Retail Investors: UCITS Eligible or 
Not Eligible? (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=935214. 
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In addition to synthetic hedge funds discussed supra at Part I.C., there 
is also a new breed of mutual fund: the hedged mutual fund. These funds 
employ “hedge-fund-like” trading strategies and leverage and hedging to 
the extent permitted under the Investment Company Act.142 As with other 
hedge fund substitute investments, hedged mutual funds are often marketed 
to retail investors as hedge fund alternatives.143 To accommodate this 
growth and these new funds, Morningstar has created a new mutual fund 
category: “Long/Short.”144 According to Morningstar, as of December 31, 
2007 there were 162 mutual funds under this category.145  
2. Black Market Markets 
The private market is also providing alternatives for hedge funds that 
want the benefits of a public listing but are currently barred from accessing 
this market or otherwise do not want to do so for other regulatory reasons. 
The listings of Oaktree and Apollo on GSTrUE are strong examples.146  
Hedge funds have also responded to U.S. regulatory prohibitions by 
going abroad to publicly raise capital from retail investors. For example, 
from 2005 through to 2007 sixteen hedge funds and funds-of-funds 
sponsored have made initial public offerings on Euronext, the LSE or AIM, 
raising a total of $5.578 billion.147 These funds are not just listing in Europe 
in response to the regulatory bar in the United States on such public capital 
raising and listing; they are also using the opportunity to tap into demand 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See generally Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Funds for Retail Investors? An Examination of 
Hedged Mutual Funds (Centre for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 07-04, 2007), available at 
http://www.cfr-cologne.de/download/workingpaper/cfr-07-04.pdf. 
 143. See Forward Launches Hedge Fund in Sheep’s Clothing, ALLABOUTALPHA.COM, Jan. 14, 
2007, http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2007/01/14/forward-launches-hedge-fund-in-sheeps-clothing/ 
(commenting on Forward Management’s launch of a hedged mutual fund and stating, “here’s an 
example of a mutual fund that is pursuing an all-out hedge fund strategy”); Phil Davis, Hedge 
Fund Entrepreneurs Could Change Retail Landscape, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 17, 2006, at 2 
(reporting that hedged mutual funds “known as ‘poor man’s hedge funds’, are becoming 
increasingly popular in the [U.S.]”); Frederick P. Gabriel, Jr., More Mutual Fund Firms Add 
Portfolios That Employ Hedging, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, at 3 (reporting that “[i]n an 
effort to get in on the rising popularity of hedge funds” the Janus Capital Group, Inc. and JP 
Morgan Chase & Co. have launched hedged mutual funds); Russ Wiles, Hedged Mutual Funds 
Offer Defense Strategy, CHI. SUN TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 77 (reporting that “[i]t’s the ultimate in 
blue-collar snob appeal: A growing number of mutual funds now mimic hedge funds”). 
 144. See Dan McNeela, The Long and Short of It, MORNINGSTAR.COM, Mar. 6, 2006, 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=158016&_qsbpa=y (“Morningstar’s new 
category helps investors find hedge-fund-like strategies.”). 
 145. See Morningstar.com, Fund Returns, http://news.morningstar.com/fundReturns/ 
FundReturns.html?category=$FOCA$LO (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
 146. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. The Apollo listing is moving to the NYSE, 
but the Oaktree listing will assumedly move to Portal Alliance with GSTrUE is consolidated into 
this market. 
 147. Dealogic Database, Hedge Fund and Hedge Fund Investing IPOs Priced Since 2005 on the 
Euronext and London Stock Exchange (search data on file with author). 
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and offer U.S. investors this public investment opportunity from abroad.148 
Moreover, the increasing competitiveness of the global capital market and 
regulators encourages European listings of hedge funds. And the European 
exchanges are rapidly developing regulatory architecture to accommodate 
and compete for hedge fund listings. The principal exchanges in Europe 
competing for these listings are Euronext and the LSE. Euronext has 
traditionally had a regulatory advantage over the LSE, since the LSE has 
imposed greater listing and offering strictures than those required by 
Euronext, which only requires the bare minimum mandated by E.U. 
regulation.149 
However, in October 2006, the FSA announced an initiative to consider 
permitting hedge funds-of-funds to be generally marketed to retail 
investors.150 The FSA is also currently implementing revised LSE listing 
rules to further accommodate hedge funds and private equity listings.151 In 
anticipation of these rule revisions, the LSE has announced the 
establishment of a dedicated new market, the Specialist Fund Market, for 
institutional investors and issuers of single strategy hedge funds and private 
equity vehicles.152 This market, which is deliberately less regulated than the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See Davidoff, supra note 92, manuscript at 42. Given the increased ability of U.S. 
investors to invest abroad through U.S.-based brokers, this is an opportunity U.S. retail investors 
can utilize to sidestep prohibitions in the United States. See Aaron Lucchetti, Global Investing 
Made Easy—Individuals Have More Ways to Buy Overseas Stocks Faster and Cheaper than Ever 
Before, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2006, at B1. 
 149. Euronext Amsterdam has attracted a number of listings due to provisions in the Dutch 
Financial Markets Supervision Act and Euronext Amsterdam’s listing rules, which permit fast-
track, light regime listing procedure for international investment companies that have their 
registered office in States designated by the Finance Minister. See Financial Markets Supervision 
Act, at § 2:66 ((Wft) Jan. 1, 2007). To date, this includes Guernsey, Ireland, Jersey, Luxembourg 
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Fund Market, (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/exeres/ 
CAF85279-3285-47B4-A5A6-E66269A0E8E2.htm. 
2008] Paradigm Shift 367 
LSE’s Main Market, was set up to better position the LSE to attract hedge 
fund listings away from Euronext.153 
3. Hedge Fund Intermediation 
The new paradigm results in wider and unanticipated investment by 
retail investors as they gain exposure to private investments through 
intermediaries. For example, retail investors are generally barred from 
investing in hedge funds and private equity because of the high net worth 
and investment thresholds that these types of investments demand.154 Yet, 
through intermediary investment they may have significant exposure to 
these investments.155 In 2006, it was estimated that pension funds had 
invested approximately $50.5 billion in hedge funds.156 And many public 
companies, such as Goldman, Sachs & Co. derive significant amounts of 
revenue from hedge fund type trading strategies.157 Thus, despite their SEC-
determined unsuitability for retail investment, retail investors still 
involuntarily or unwittingly have interests in these investments.158 
CONCLUSION 
The new capital markets paradigm is one of opportunity and challenge. 
It calls into question the content and structure of the federal securities code, 
and subjects the SEC as regulator to greater competitive force. But 
historically, fundamental new securities law is the product of scandal.159 
Even if the new capital markets paradigm necessitates it, Congress and the 
SEC are politically unlikely to rework the entirety of securities regulation to 
reflect these changes in the markets. That is, until a new scandal inevitably 
arises.160 
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Nonetheless, the new paradigm has the potential to spur the SEC in the 
near term toward more economic regulation—regulation more responsive to 
market competition. The forces of financial innovation, particularly 
increasingly sophisticated academic finance research, also provide the SEC 
the tools to regulate more intelligently.161 The SEC, though, has been slow 
to account for the new paradigm in its regulation by adopting modern 
regulatory techniques such as cost-benefit analysis.162 The SEC’s failure to 
consider its hedge fund regulation using these tools and with heed to the 
new paradigm is just one illustration. 
But the new paradigm is inevitably coming. The SEC’s failure risks not 
only its competitiveness in the regulated public markets, but it also raises 
the specter of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom as the new paradigm’s 
competitive forces increasingly force the SEC to act. Yet, without a sound 
regulatory approach, the SEC has a greater chance of regulating to 
uneconomical political interests. 
A telling illustration comes not just from the SEC’s regulatory 
experience with hedge funds, but also from its recent adoption of relaxed 
foreign private issuer de-registration rules and rules permitting these issuers 
to utilize international financial reporting standards when listing and 
offering securities in the United States.163 The SEC did not conduct any 
substantive cost-benefit analysis or rely on any research or study to regulate 
with respect to these items.164 Instead, the SEC appeared to be deregulating 
in response to external political forces spurred by competitive pressure.165 
This regulation might still have been appropriate, but future SEC regulation 
would be on sounder firmament if the SEC adopted a holistic approach and 
more rigorous regulatory techniques. The new regulatory paradigm requires 
not only a rethink of the securities laws but the entirety of the regulatory 
process. 
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